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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
inquiry into the husband's counterclaim inasmuch as he was not com-
petent to testify on that issue.105
Dunlap represents a marked shift in judicial attitude toward dis-
closure in matrimonial actions. Formerly, a demonstration of special
circumstances was required in order to obtain disclosure; now, dis-
closure can be foreclosed only by an avowal of special circumstances.
Such a construction is in accord with the general approach to disclosure
under the CPLR1 6 and is laudably responsive to the Court of Appeals
interpretation of article 31.107
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Satisfaction of section 17 of Court of Claims Act
automatically satisfies "special circumstances" requirement.
In General Building Supply Corp. v. State0 8 claimant sought leave
to examine the state's consultant engineer with regard to flooding on a
certain highway project. In support of its motion,10 9 claimant averred
that the examination was material and necessary to the proper prepara-
tion for trial within the meaning of section 17 of the Court of Claims
Act." 0 For, the engineer was the only person in charge of the project
who had personal knowledge of events underlying its claim. Thus,
claimant contended that adequate "special circumstances" as prescribed
under CPLR 3101 justified the examination of the non-party witness.
In granting the motion to examine, the Court of Claims was heavily
influenced by the admission of the state's own engineer at an earlier
examination that he had no personal knowledge of the facts in issue
since on the two crucial dates involved the consultant engineer had been
in charge of the operations. Pointing out that the phrase "material and
necessary" has been equated with a test of usefulness and reason,"' the
court agreed with the observation put forth by one authority that "[i]f
a witness holds ... a key, to any substantial fact involved in the case,
how can any lawyer... be compelled to go to trial without knowing
105 CPLR 4502.
106 Under article 31, the parties are entitled, in most instances, to proceed without
prior court approval. It is only when a party believes that his adversary is abusing his
right to disclosure that a court takes cognizance of the proceedings under CPLR 3103's
provision for a protective order.
107See Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
108 63 Misc. 2d 520, 312 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Ct. Claims 1970).
109 Disclosure by the state is governed by the same rules applicable to private parties
"except that it may be obtained only by order of the court in which the action is pending
and except further that it may not include interrogatories or requests for admissions,"
CPLR 3102(f). See generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3102, commentary 10, at 269-71 (1967).
110 N.Y. Or. CLAiMs Aar § 17 (McKinney 1963).
111 Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1968).
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intimately what that witness is going to say?"" 2 Thus, the court reasoned
that the claimant could not properly prepare for trial without examin-
ing the consultant engineer. And, the court added that compliance with
section 17 of the Court of Claims Act automatically satisfied the "special
circumstances" requirement of CPLR 3101 (a) (4). Accordingly, the state
was ordered to produce the engineer for examination.
ARTICLE 32- ACCELERATED JuDcEN
Collateral Estoppel: Prior judgment establishing freedom from negli-
gence does not ipso facto establish freedom from contributory negli-
gence in second action.
In Schwartz v. Public Administrator"3 the Court of Appeals ruled
that there remained only two prerequisites to the invocation of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel: "an identity of issue which has neces-
sarily been decided in the prior action . . . and . . . a full and fair
opportunity to contest the [prior] decision."1 4 In Schwartz, the de-
fendant, driver D-1, moved to dismiss a personal injuries action
brought against him by the plaintiff, driver D-2, on the ground that
a prior adjudication of negligence on the part of driver D-2 barred
recovery. In a prior action, passengers in the Schwartz car brought a
successful personal injuries action against both drivers D-1 and D-2 as
codefendants." 3' As a result, the defendant D-1 was able to persuade
the Court that the prior determination of negligence estopped plaintiff
D-2 from demonstrating his freedom from contributory negligence, a
necessary element of his prima facie case, in the second action.
Recently, in Nesbitt v. Nimmich,116 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, refused to extend the Schwartz rationale to a slightly
varied situation. Plaintiff, driver D-1, moved for summary judgment
in a personal injury action against defendant, driver D-2, on the basis
of a prior action against both drivers. In contrast to the facts in
Schwartz, the jury had returned a verdict against the present defendant
alone, acquitting the present plaintiff of negligence vis-hL-vis the original
plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff argued that by implication the jury had exon-
erated him on the issue of contributory negligence. The appellate
division disagreed, reasoning that "it does not necessarily follow that
112 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 22, at 27 (1970).
113 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); see generally Rosenberg,
Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165 (1969); The Quarterly Survey,
44 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 135, 144-51 (1969).
114 24 N.Y.2d at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
115 80 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1968).
116 34 App. Div. 2d 958, 312 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970).
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